Which of your APIs are unauthenticated, and which have had no traffic for 30 days?
Defender for APIs answers both from observed traffic rather than from documentation. It marks endpoints inactive after 30 days without a call, and marks an API unauthenticated when none of the expected authentication mechanisms executed during the call.

- 30 daysWithout traffic before an endpoint is Inactive
- OWASP API Top 10Covered by runtime threat detection
- ObservedFindings come from traffic, not from specs
- Azure APIMThe scope of the plan today
Eight things it tells you that documentation does not.
An inventory of what is actually published
A single dashboard with an aggregated view of all managed APIs, broken down by API collections, endpoints and Azure API Management services. For organisations where teams publish APIs independently, this is frequently the first complete list anybody has seen.
Which endpoints are unauthenticated, measured properly
It assesses authentication by verifying the presence of API Management subscription keys where subscription is required, and the execution of policies validating JWT, client certificates and Microsoft Entra tokens. If none of those executed during the call, the API is marked unauthenticated.
Which endpoints nobody is using
Endpoints that have received no API call traffic in the last 30 days are marked inactive, with a last called date in UTC. Unused APIs are pure attack surface with no offsetting benefit, and recommendations explicitly include disabling and removing them.
Which endpoints are exposed externally
An external traffic observed date shows when external API traffic was seen going to or from the endpoint. That distinguishes an API that is theoretically reachable from one that external parties are actually calling, which is a different risk conversation.
Which APIs handle sensitive data
API data classification classifies request and response bodies based on supported data types, to support risk prioritisation. An unauthenticated endpoint returning nothing sensitive and an unauthenticated endpoint returning personal data are the same finding until this classification separates them.
Runtime threat detection across the OWASP API Top 10
Ingested API traffic monitored with runtime anomaly detection using machine learning and rule-based analytics. Alerts cover the top ten OWASP API threats, data exfiltration, volumetric attacks, anomalous and suspicious API parameters, traffic and IP access anomalies, and usage patterns.
API risk in the wider attack path picture
With Defender CSPM enabled alongside, Cloud Security Graph analyses assets and connections to expose risks and possible lateral movement paths, and Cloud Security Explorer includes two built-in query templates for identifying risky API assets.
Findings where the people who own APIs already work
With the plan enabled, API security recommendations and alerts appear in the Azure API Management portal as well as in Defender for Cloud, and alerts export to SIEM systems such as Microsoft Sentinel. Findings that reach the API team without a portal switch get acted on more often.
Everything is derived from observed traffic, which is why the inventory surprises people.
That design decision explains both the strength of the findings and the one behaviour that confuses teams during onboarding.
- Authentication is not read from a specification. It is assessed by verifying the presence of API Management subscription keys where a subscription is required, and the execution of policies validating JWT, client certificates and Microsoft Entra tokens. An API that documents authentication but does not execute it is marked unauthenticated.
- Usage is measured the same way. Endpoints with no API call traffic in the last 30 days are marked inactive, with a last called date recorded in UTC, and external exposure is recorded as the date external traffic was actually observed rather than as a configuration property.
- The behaviour that confuses people during onboarding follows from this: API endpoints that have not received any traffic since being onboarded display the status awaiting data. That is not an error and it is not a coverage gap, it is the plan waiting for a call to observe.
- Practically, that means the value of the inventory grows over the first weeks. An assessment run the day after onboarding will show a lot of awaiting data. One run a month later shows which endpoints are used, by whom, from where, and whether authentication actually happened.
Four things that make an API programme produce change.
We let it observe before we report
Endpoints with no traffic since onboarding show as awaiting data, and inactive status needs 30 days without a call to be meaningful. An assessment run in week one produces an incomplete picture and an unnecessary argument. Waiting for the window is what makes the findings defensible.
We lead with unauthenticated endpoints, evidenced
The authentication assessment verifies whether subscription keys were present where required and whether policies validating JWT, client certificates or Entra tokens actually executed during the call. That is observed evidence rather than a configuration review, which is a much harder finding to dismiss.
We remove what nobody uses first
Disabling and removing unused APIs is one of the explicit recommendations, and it is the only security improvement that costs nothing and breaks nothing. Endpoints inactive for 30 days are the starting list, and it is usually longer than the owning team expects.
We put findings where the API owners already are
With the plan enabled, recommendations and alerts appear in the Azure API Management portal as well as in Defender for Cloud. Findings that reach a developer in the tool they already use get fixed. Findings in a security portal they do not have access to get discussed.
Four phases across roughly six weeks.
- 01Week 1
Onboard and start observing
The plan enabled and APIs onboarded, either from the Defender for Cloud portal or from within the API Management instance. Expect a lot of awaiting data at this point, which is the plan working rather than a problem.
- Plan enabled and APIs onboarded
- API Management instances confirmed in scope
- Baseline inventory captured
- Recommendations to onboard remaining APIs actioned
- 02Weeks 2 to 4
Let traffic accumulate, then read the findings
Thirty days is the meaningful window, since that is the threshold for marking an endpoint inactive. During this period authentication status, external traffic and data classification all populate from real calls rather than from assumptions.
- Unauthenticated endpoints identified from observed calls
- Inactive endpoints identified after 30 days
- Externally called endpoints listed
- Sensitive data carrying APIs classified
- 03Week 5
Act on the two easiest wins
Unused APIs disabled and removed, which is recommended explicitly and reduces attack surface at no functional cost. Unauthenticated endpoints taken to their owning teams with evidence that no authentication mechanism executed during actual calls.
- Unused APIs disabled or removed
- Unauthenticated endpoints assigned to owners
- Authentication remediation planned per API
- Posture recommendations prioritised by data classification
- 04Week 6
Wire detection into the response workflow
Runtime alerts routed to whoever responds, exported into Sentinel or another SIEM where one exists, and recommendations surfaced in the API Management portal so the teams who own the APIs see them without switching tools.
- Alerts exported to the SIEM
- Recommendations visible in the API Management portal
- Response owner named for API alerts
- Recurring review scheduled for new APIs
Six situations where APIs are the weak point.
A business exposing APIs to partners
Partner integrations accumulate, and each one is an authenticated channel until somebody publishes a version that is not. The external traffic observed date and the authentication status together answer whether any externally called endpoint is running without authentication actually executing.
A regulated firm with open banking or payment interfaces
Where APIs carry regulated data, data classification of request and response bodies is what allows risk to be prioritised properly. An unauthenticated endpoint carrying no sensitive data and one carrying customer records are very different findings, and the classification separates them.
A retailer whose mobile app is API driven
Consumer-facing APIs attract volumetric attacks, credential stuffing and parameter manipulation. Runtime detection covers volumetric attacks, anomalous and suspicious API parameters, and traffic and IP access anomalies, which are precisely the patterns that appear against a retail API.
An organisation that has never inventoried its APIs
The inventory is the first deliverable and frequently the most valuable. An aggregated view of all managed APIs broken down by collection, endpoint and API Management service tends to include endpoints nobody currently owns, which is a finding in itself.
A company with old APIs nobody retired
Versioned APIs accumulate because deprecating one requires knowing who still calls it. Thirty days of traffic data answers that question directly, and the recommendation to disable and remove unused APIs turns a difficult conversation into an evidenced one.
A business already running Defender CSPM
With both enabled, Cloud Security Graph analyses assets and connections to expose risks and possible lateral movement paths, and Cloud Security Explorer offers built-in query templates for risky API assets. APIs stop being a separate silo and become part of the same risk picture.
How UAE organisations understand their API exposure.
| Feature | Continuous API monitoring | Periodic penetration testing | Documentation and trust |
|---|---|---|---|
Inventory from observed traffic | Yes | At test time | No |
Unauthenticated endpoints found | Continuously | At test time | If someone checks |
Unused endpoints identified | After 30 days without traffic | Rarely | No |
External exposure observed | Yes, with dates | Inferred | Assumed |
Sensitive data carrying APIs known | Classified | Sometimes | No |
Runtime attacks detected | Yes, OWASP API Top 10 | No | No |
New APIs covered automatically | On onboarding | Next test | No |
Findings reach the API team | In the APIM portal | In a report | Not applicable |
Attack path context | With Defender CSPM | No | No |
Effort per cycle | Low | High | None |
Ten data points per endpoint, and what each is good for.
| Field or capability | The question it answers | |
|---|---|---|
| Endpoint name and URL path with method | What exists, as defined in API Management | |
| Last called date in UTC | Is anything using this | |
| 30 days unused, marked Inactive | Can this be removed | |
| Authentication status | Did an authentication mechanism actually execute | |
| External traffic observed date | Is this being called from outside | |
| Data classification | Does this carry sensitive data | |
| Awaiting data status | No traffic observed since onboarding | |
| Security recommendations | What to fix, prioritised by risk | |
| Runtime alerts | Is this being attacked right now | |
| Cloud Security Explorer templates | Which API assets are risky, queried directly |
Five steps, and one of them is waiting.
- 1
Enable the plan and onboard the APIs
Onboarding is available from the Defender for Cloud portal or from within the API Management instance in the Azure portal. Recommendations include onboarding APIs to the plan, which is a useful cross-check that nothing was missed.
- 2
Allow at least 30 days of observation
The inactive threshold is 30 days without traffic, and endpoints with no traffic since onboarding show as awaiting data. Reading the findings before that window has passed produces a picture that is technically accurate and practically misleading.
- 3
Triage by authentication and data classification together
Unauthenticated endpoints ranked by whether they carry sensitive data, using the classification of request and response bodies. That combination is what turns a list of findings into a priority order the business will accept.
- 4
Remove the unused and fix the unauthenticated
Disabling and removing unused APIs first, since it is recommended explicitly and carries no functional cost. Then authentication remediation with the owning teams, supported by evidence that no mechanism executed during real calls rather than by a configuration opinion.
- 5
Connect detection to response
Runtime alerts covering the OWASP API Top 10, data exfiltration, volumetric attacks and access anomalies routed to a named responder and exported to Sentinel or another SIEM, with recommendations surfaced in the API Management portal for the teams who own the code.
What organisations ask about Defender for APIs.
Fifteen questions about your own API estate.
Inventory
- How many APIs do we publish?A number, from observation.
- Which are called from outside?Observed, not configured.
- Which had no traffic in 30 days?They are attack surface.
- Are all API Management instances onboarded?There is a recommendation for this.
- Who owns each API?Findings need an owner.
Authentication
- Which endpoints are unauthenticated?Measured during real calls.
- Do we require subscription keys?One of the mechanisms assessed.
- Do we validate JWT in policy?Another assessed mechanism.
- Do we use client certificates anywhere?Also assessed.
- Do we validate Entra tokens?The fourth mechanism.
Risk and response
- Which APIs carry sensitive data?Data classification shows this.
- Is Defender CSPM enabled alongside?It adds attack path context.
- Do alerts reach the SIEM?Export is supported.
- Do API teams see the recommendations?They appear in the APIM portal.
- Who responds to an API alert at night?Name them.
Count your published APIs, then count how many were called in the last month.
If those numbers differ, the difference is attack surface with no offsetting benefit. Removing it is the easiest security improvement available and nothing depends on it.
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