Emergency access accounts, UAE

Two accounts, in two safes, tested every ninety days. Otherwise your tenant has a single point of failure with a person attached to it.

Microsoft guidance is specific: create two or more cloud-only emergency access accounts on the onmicrosoft.com domain, register a passkey or certificate-based authentication, exclude them from Conditional Access policies that block sign-in, alert on every use, and validate that they still work at least every ninety days.

Microsoft Entra emergency access accounts for UAE organisations
  • Two or moreThe published minimum, for redundancy
  • Cloud-onlyNo federation, no directory sync
  • Every 90 daysMinimum validation interval
  • Alert on useSeverity critical, every single sign-in
What the guidance requires

Seven requirements, and almost every tenant we look at fails at least two.

Microsoft frames the purpose plainly: reduce the impact of accidental lack of administrative access by creating two or more emergency access accounts, used only for emergency or break-glass scenarios where normal administrative accounts cannot be used. The requirements below are what make them work when that day arrives.

Cloud-only, on the onmicrosoft.com domain

Microsoft states these should be cloud-only accounts using the onmicrosoft.com domain, not federated and not synchronised from on-premises. That is not a preference. If federation is unavailable because an identity provider is down, an account that depends on it is unusable during precisely the outage it exists to survive.

A passkey or certificate-based authentication, and nothing weaker

The published choice is a passkey, which is recommended, or certificate-based authentication where a public key infrastructure already exists. Both satisfy the mandatory multifactor authentication requirements. The old pattern of a very long password with MFA excluded is no longer the guidance, and it has not been for some time.

A different method from your normal administrative accounts

Microsoft is explicit: use strong authentication that does not use the same authentication methods as your other administrative accounts, giving the example that if your normal admin account uses Authenticator, the emergency account should use a FIDO2 security key. Shared method equals shared failure, which defeats the point of the account entirely.

Excluded from Conditional Access policies that block sign-in

The published warning is direct: an emergency access account subject to a policy requiring MFA, a compliant device or another control might be unusable during the exact emergency scenarios it is designed for. Microsoft also notes report-only policies do not block access and do not require an exclusion, which is a useful distinction when auditing.

Credentials in fireproof safes, in separate locations

Stored in a known secure location available to multiple members of the administration team, not associated with any individual, and not connected to employee-supplied devices such as phones. Microsoft specifies secure, fireproof safes in secure, separate locations, and says to change safe combinations regularly and after anyone with access leaves.

An alert on every use, at critical severity

Microsoft documents the pattern: send Entra sign-in logs to Azure Monitor, take the object identifiers of the accounts, and create a log alert querying SigninLogs filtered by those identifiers with a static threshold greater than zero. The published severity to use is critical, wired to an action group that reaches administrators by email, SMS, push or voice.

Validated at least every ninety days, as a drill

Not a paperwork exercise. The published validation includes confirming the accounts can sign in and perform administrative tasks, that monitoring and alerting actually trigger, that the authorised user list is current, that the break-glass process is documented, and that nobody registered MFA or self-service password reset to an individual device or personal details.

The lockout nobody plans for

Everyone is eligible, approval is required, and there is nobody left to approve.

Microsoft lists five scenarios where an organisation cannot administer its own tenant. The fifth is the one that catches mature organisations rather than careless ones.

  • Quoted: all Global Administrator and Privileged Role Administrator role assignments are eligible rather than active, activation requires approval, and no approvers are selected, or all selected approvers were removed from the directory.
  • Active Global Administrators and Privileged Role Administrators are the default approvers when none are selected. But because none are active, nobody can approve an activation, and Microsoft states that tenant administration is effectively locked.
  • That is a deadlock produced by doing privileged access management well and then losing the people. It is not a configuration error anyone would spot in a review, and it is exactly why Microsoft says emergency access accounts should be permanent active in Privileged Identity Management rather than eligible.
  • The other four scenarios are more familiar: an identity provider outage breaking federated sign-in, MFA devices or the MFA service being unavailable, the last Global Administrator leaving and their account being disabled on-premises, and a natural disaster taking out mobile networks.
Ask us to check your break-glass position
How we approach it

Four things that separate a real break-glass account from a comforting one.

This is a control that is trivially easy to create and almost never verified. Every organisation we assess has something. Very few have something that has been signed into in the last year.

We sign in during the assessment, not just look at the configuration

The only meaningful test of a break-glass account is using it. Microsoft published validation includes confirming the account can sign in and perform administrative tasks, and confirming that the alerting fires. Reading the configuration tells you what should happen. Signing in tells you what does, and the two differ more often than people expect.

We audit the Conditional Access exclusions against every policy

Not just the policies that existed when the account was created. Policies accumulate, and a new one requiring a compliant device is precisely the sort of change that quietly removes your last route into the tenant. Microsoft also distinguishes report-only policies, which do not block and do not require an exclusion, and that distinction saves unnecessary exclusions.

We check the PIM assignment type, which people get wrong

Microsoft is explicit that the Global Administrator role assignment on an emergency access account should be permanent active rather than eligible. An eligible assignment requires activation, activation can require approval, and the published deadlock scenario is exactly what happens when no approver remains. Eligible break-glass is not break-glass.

We separate cloud break-glass from on-premises break-glass

Microsoft federation guidance says to keep emergency access for on-premises systems and for cloud services distinct, with no dependency of one on the other, because sourcing authentication for emergency accounts from other systems adds unnecessary risk during an outage. Organisations that run Active Directory Federation Services frequently have exactly that dependency.

Where this matters most

Six UAE situations where the break-glass position gets tested.

Microsoft publishes five scenarios where an organisation loses administrative access to its own tenant. All five are ordinary events rather than exotic ones, which is what makes this worth doing properly.

A federated organisation whose identity provider goes down

Microsoft names this first: user accounts are federated and federation is unavailable because of a cell-network break or identity-provider outage, so users cannot sign in when Entra redirects to their identity provider. A cloud-only emergency account on the onmicrosoft.com domain is the only thing that still works, which is precisely why the requirement exists.

An organisation where administrators lost their MFA devices

The published scenario is administrators registered through Entra multifactor authentication whose individual devices are unavailable or where the service is unavailable, with the example of a cell network outage preventing phone calls and text messages, the only two methods they registered. That is a mundane failure with a total consequence.

A business where the last Global Administrator has left

Microsoft notes that Entra prevents the last Global Administrator account from being deleted, but does not prevent the account being deleted or disabled on-premises, and either situation might make the organisation unable to recover the account. In a group where a departure is processed by HR through the on-premises directory, this is not a hypothetical.

An operator hit by a natural disaster or major outage

Named directly in the published list: unforeseen circumstances such as a natural disaster emergency, during which mobile phone or other networks might be unavailable. This is also why the validation drill checks that any registered device can communicate through at least two network paths that do not share a common failure mode.

A regulated organisation that must evidence emergency procedures

Microsoft publishes guidance mapping emergency access accounts to HIPAA emergency access procedure requirements, and the same shape of requirement appears in many frameworks. Sign-in and audit log monitoring, a post-mortem review after every use, and validation drills at least every ninety days together produce the evidence an auditor wants.

A group that has just implemented Privileged Identity Management well

The most modern failure mode. All Global Administrator and Privileged Role Administrator assignments made eligible, activation requiring approval, and then the approvers leave the directory. Microsoft states tenant administration is effectively locked. A permanent active emergency account is the only thing that resolves it without opening a support case.

Three positions

How UAE organisations handle break-glass access.

The middle column is the most common and the most dangerous, because it looks like a control. An account exists, a password is written down somewhere, and nobody has signed into it since the tenant was built.
At least two accounts
Configured to guidanceYes
An account exists somewhereUsually one
No break-glass accountNone
Cloud-only and unfederated
Configured to guidanceYes
An account exists somewhereSometimes
No break-glass accountNot applicable
Phishing-resistant authentication
Configured to guidanceYes
An account exists somewhereRarely
No break-glass accountNot applicable
Different method from normal admin accounts
Configured to guidanceYes
An account exists somewhereNo
No break-glass accountNot applicable
Excluded from blocking policies
Configured to guidanceYes
An account exists somewhereUnverified
No break-glass accountNot applicable
Permanent active in PIM
Configured to guidanceYes
An account exists somewhereUnknown
No break-glass accountNot applicable
Credentials split across secure locations
Configured to guidanceYes
An account exists somewhereOne envelope
No break-glass accountNone
Alert on every use
Configured to guidanceYes
An account exists somewhereNo
No break-glass accountNo
Validated on a schedule
Configured to guidanceEvery 90 days
An account exists somewhereNever
No break-glass accountNot applicable
Position during a real outage
Configured to guidanceRecoverable
An account exists somewhereUnknown
No break-glass accountLocked out
The guardrails

Ten published requirements, and why each one exists.

Requirements as published in the security guardrails summary. The right hand column is the failure each prevents, which is ours.
RequirementWhat it prevents
Maintain at least two emergency access accountsA single credential, a single safe or a single registered device becoming the point of failure
Cloud-only accounts on the onmicrosoft.com domainThe account being unusable during exactly the federation or sync outage it exists for
Phishing-resistant methods, different from normal admin accountsA shared method meaning a shared outage, and a shared compromise
Credentials and devices do not expire or get auto-cleanedAn account that quietly stopped working months before anybody needed it
Permanent active in PIM, not eligibleThe activation deadlock where no approver remains to approve anything
A designated secure workstation for useThe highest privilege in the tenant being exercised from a compromised laptop
Credentials in separate secure fireproof locationsOne fire, one flood or one person removing the only copy
Excluded from blocking Conditional Access policiesThe policy that protects the tenant also locking you out of fixing it
Monitor all sign-in and audit activity with alertsA break-glass account being used quietly by somebody who should not have it
Validate functionality at least every 90 daysDiscovering during a real outage that the credential no longer works
How an engagement runs

Five steps, and it is a short engagement with a large consequence.

Typically one to three weeks, including the first drill. This is the least expensive piece of resilience work most organisations can do, and the one most likely to have never been done.
  1. 1

    Assess what exists and try to use it

    Finding existing emergency access accounts, checking whether they are cloud-only, what method is registered, whether they are excluded from every blocking Conditional Access policy, whether the PIM assignment is permanent active, and then actually signing in. That last step is the assessment, and it frequently ends the discussion about whether work is needed.

  2. 2

    Create or remediate to the published requirements

    Two or more cloud-only accounts on the onmicrosoft.com domain with the Global Administrator role, registered with a passkey or certificate-based authentication, using a different method from your normal administrative accounts, with credentials and devices that do not expire or fall into automated cleanup.

  3. 3

    Fix the Conditional Access position

    A dedicated security group, the published example being EmergencyAccess, excluded from every policy that blocks or restricts sign-in. Report-only policies are left alone, since they do not block and do not need exclusion. Contingency policies that can be enabled during an outage to restore access for critical users are designed at the same time.

  4. 4

    Wire the monitoring and store the credentials

    Entra sign-in logs to Azure Monitor, object identifiers captured, a log alert on SigninLogs filtered to those accounts with a static threshold above zero at critical severity, and an action group reaching administrators by more than one channel. Credentials then split across secure, fireproof, separate locations with a documented access list.

  5. 5

    Run the first drill and schedule the next

    Security monitoring told in advance, sign-in performed, an administrative task performed, the alert confirmed to have fired, and the post-mortem team walked through the review they would conduct. Then the ninety day cadence booked, plus triggers for staff changes and subscription changes.

Straight answers

What organisations ask about emergency access accounts.

The quarterly drill

Fifteen checks to run every ninety days.

Microsoft publishes the validation steps, and this is our working version of them. The point is not the list, it is that somebody actually performs it on a schedule rather than assuming.

Does it still work

  • Can each account sign in?
    Actually sign in, not check the account exists.
  • Can it perform an administrative task?
    Sign-in alone is not the test.
  • Did the alert fire?
    The drill also tests the monitoring.
  • Was security monitoring told first?
    Microsoft says to make them aware.
  • Does the current Conditional Access config still permit it?
    Test quarterly, per guidance.

Is it still configured correctly

  • Still cloud-only and unfederated?
    Directory changes can alter this.
  • Still permanent active in PIM?
    Not eligible, per the guidance.
  • Has the credential expired or been cleaned up?
    It must not be in scope of auto-cleanup.
  • Any MFA or SSPR registered to a personal device?
    Explicitly checked in the published steps.
  • Can any registered device reach two independent networks?
    No shared failure mode.

Do the people and process still work

  • Is the authorised user list current?
    Reviewed at every validation.
  • Is the break-glass process documented and current?
    And findable during an outage.
  • Are the relevant people trained on it?
    Administrators and security officers.
  • Have safe combinations been changed?
    Regularly, and after anyone leaves.
  • Is the post-mortem team defined?
    Before it is needed, not after.
Next step

Sign in to your break-glass account today. If you cannot, you did not have one.

Tell us about tenant ownership, administrator arrangements, recovery methods and existing test records. We will confirm the requirements and proposed scope with you.