Endpoint Privilege Management, UAE

Before removing local admin rights, find out how often anybody actually elevates. There is a report for that.

Endpoint Privilege Management reports unmanaged elevations, meaning every time somebody used Run as administrator without it, before you change anything. Then it lets standard users run the specific things that genuinely need elevation, through an isolated virtual account that is never added to the local administrators group.

Intune Endpoint Privilege Management for UAE organisations
  • WindowsThe supported platform
  • Five typesAutomatic, user confirmed, current user, approved, deny
  • Virtual accountIsolated, and not a local administrator
  • exe, msi, ps1The file types it elevates
The order that makes this work

Audit first, then rules, then removal. Not the other way round.

Microsoft describes the deployment step as enable auditing, create rules, and monitor. That sequence is the whole difference between a project that lands and one that gets reversed in the second week.

  • Enable the unmanaged elevation reporting while everybody still has their administrator rights. For a few weeks you simply collect evidence of what people are actually elevating, which in most organisations turns out to be a much shorter list than anyone predicted.
  • Build rules for the things that appear repeatedly and are legitimate. Publisher certificate matching, argument constraints and child process controls make those rules specific enough to be safe rather than a broad permission that undoes the point of the exercise.
  • Set the default elevation response and add support approved as the catch-all, so that anything you did not anticipate becomes a request somebody handles rather than a blocked user with no route forward. That is what prevents the flood of complaints on day one.
  • Only then remove local administrator rights, and do it in waves. Because the rules were written from observed behaviour rather than from a guess, the population that gets moved first is the one you already have evidence for.
Ask us to run the audit phase first
How it works

Eight things about Endpoint Privilege Management that decide how you deploy it.

Microsoft describes it as letting users run as standard users without administrator rights while still completing tasks that require elevated privileges, naming application installs, driver updates and certain Windows diagnostics as the common cases. It applies to Windows.

The unmanaged elevation report, which comes before any change

Microsoft provides reporting on unmanaged elevations, meaning all file elevations happening without Endpoint Privilege Management, such as when a user with administrative rights uses the Windows Run as administrator action. Turning that on before removing anybody rights tells you exactly what would break, which converts the whole project from an argument into a list.

A virtual account, not membership of the administrators group

For most elevation types the service uses a virtual account isolated from the logged-on user account, and Microsoft states plainly that neither of these accounts is added to the local administrators group. That is the security property the whole product rests on: the elevated process runs with administrative capability without any account gaining standing administrative membership.

User confirmed, which is where most rules should start

Users get a right-click context menu option to run with elevated access, and administrators can require extra validation through an authentication prompt, a business justification, or both. That combination gives you a record of what was elevated and why, without anybody waiting for approval, and it is the type that produces the most useful data during a rollout.

Support approved, for the cases that warrant a person

The user submits a request to run an application with elevated permissions, an administrator approves it, and the user is notified they can retry the elevation on the device. This is the right type for the long tail of unusual requests, and it means you do not have to write a rule in advance for every possible legitimate need.

Automatic, with an explicit warning attached

Automatic rules elevate applications without any input from the user, which is right for well-understood cases such as an approved installer. Microsoft attaches a specific caution: broad rules in this category can have widespread impact on the security posture of the organisation. Automatic is the type to use narrowly and deliberately, not the default.

Elevate as current user, and why to avoid it where you can

This type runs the elevated process under the signed-in user own account rather than the virtual account, preserving compatibility with tools that depend on the user profile, and it supports Windows Authentication requiring reauthentication before elevation. Microsoft states it introduces a broader attack surface and reduces isolation from user data, and advises using it only where virtual account elevation causes application failures.

Rules that can be specific enough to be safe

Rules can be built on file name, path and other attributes, with child process controls governing what an elevated application can spawn, argument support allowing only certain parameters, file hash matching, and publisher certificate matching. A rule based on publisher certificate plus argument constraints is a materially different thing from a rule that says any file called setup.exe.

Deny rules, which are the part people forget exists

A deny rule identifies a file that Endpoint Privilege Management blocks from running in an elevated context. Microsoft frames it as ensuring known or potentially malicious files cannot run elevated. It is the complement to the allow rules and it is worth building alongside them rather than as an afterthought once something has already run.

How we approach it

Four things that stop this becoming the project everybody remembers badly.

Removing administrator rights is one of the few security changes users notice immediately and personally. Every failure we have been asked to fix afterwards failed for one of these four reasons.

We audit before we remove anything

Microsoft own deployment guidance starts with enabling auditing. We run the unmanaged elevation reporting while everybody still has their rights, so the rules are written from what people actually elevate rather than from what anybody assumed. In most organisations the real list is short, specific and much less alarming than the debate that preceded it.

We prefer the virtual account and say why

Most elevation types use a virtual account isolated from the user account, and neither account is added to the local administrators group. Elevate as current user gives that up. Microsoft advises using it only where virtual account elevation causes application failures and scoping it tightly, and we hold that line rather than reaching for it whenever something is awkward.

We write rules specific enough to be worth having

A rule matching a file name is close to giving the right back. Publisher certificate matching, file hash matching, argument constraints and child process controls are what make a rule a genuine control. Writing them takes longer and it is the difference between least privilege and a differently shaped administrator right.

We give people a route before we close the old one

Support approved requests, a defined approver and an agreed response time, all working before rights are removed. The reason these projects get reversed is never the technology, it is a senior person blocked at an inconvenient moment with no way forward. Having the route in place first removes that failure mode entirely.

Where this matters most

Six UAE situations where standing administrator rights are the real exposure.

The common thread is that malware executed by a user with administrative rights inherits those rights immediately, which is what turns an ordinary click into an incident.

A regulated firm asked about least privilege

Banks, finance companies, insurers and DIFC or ADGM entities are examined on whether users run with least privilege. Endpoint Privilege Management answers it with a working control and detailed logging of every elevation, rather than a policy statement contradicted by the actual membership of the local administrators group.

An organisation where everybody has admin because of two applications

The most common situation we find. Two pieces of software need elevation, nobody wanted to solve it properly, and so the whole company runs as administrator. Rules for those two applications, matched on publisher certificate, resolve a decade-old exposure in an afternoon of configuration.

Engineering or design teams with specialist software

Computer-aided design, engineering and production software frequently needs elevation for licensing, drivers or plug-ins, and the users are technical enough to have argued successfully for administrator rights. User confirmed elevation with justification gives them what they need and gives you a record, which is a better outcome for both sides.

Education, where shared devices meet varied software

Teaching staff install what a lesson requires, laboratory machines run specialist tools, and the estate is large. Support approved elevation with a defined approver handles the variety without either granting rights broadly or making the IT team the obstacle to teaching.

After a ransomware incident or a near miss

Where malware ran and had administrative rights immediately because the user did, the exposure is obvious in retrospect and the appetite for change is briefly high. This is the moment when the project is easiest to fund, and the audit phase gives you the evidence to do it without a fight.

An organisation preparing for ISO 27001 or SOC 2

Both examine privileged access on endpoints. Every elevation being logged with detailed metadata, deny rules preventing specific files from elevating, and reporting distinguishing managed from unmanaged elevation is exactly the evidence those examinations ask for, produced as a by-product of the control operating normally.

Three positions

How local administrator rights are actually handled in UAE organisations.

The middle column, administrator rights for a subset of staff, is where most well-run organisations land, and it usually includes several people whose reason for having them ended years ago.
Users run as standard users
EPM deployedYes
Admin rights for somePartly
Admin rights for everybodyNo
Elevation possible where genuinely needed
EPM deployedYes
Admin rights for someYes
Admin rights for everybodyYes
Every elevation logged with metadata
EPM deployedYes
Admin rights for someNo
Admin rights for everybodyNo
Elevation isolated from the user account
EPM deployedYes
Admin rights for someNo
Admin rights for everybodyNo
Specific applications can be blocked from elevating
EPM deployedYes
Admin rights for someNo
Admin rights for everybodyNo
Approval possible for unusual requests
EPM deployedYes
Admin rights for someNot applicable
Admin rights for everybodyNot applicable
Malware inherits administrative rights on execution
EPM deployedNo
Admin rights for someFor some users
Admin rights for everybodyYes
Evidence available for an auditor
EPM deployedStrong
Admin rights for someWeak
Admin rights for everybodyNone
Helpdesk burden from blocked installs
EPM deployedManaged
Admin rights for someModerate
Admin rights for everybodyNone, and that is the problem
Frequency in the UAE market
EPM deployedRare
Admin rights for someCommon
Admin rights for everybodyCommon in SMEs
The five elevation types

Which type to use, and what each one costs you.

Reproduced from the Microsoft definitions, with our view of where each belongs. Most working configurations use user confirmed as the backbone, support approved as the catch-all, and automatic sparingly.
TypeBehaviour and where it belongs
User confirmedRight-click run with elevated access, optionally with authentication and justification. The backbone of most configurations.
Support approvedUser requests, administrator approves, user retries. The catch-all for what you did not anticipate.
AutomaticElevates with no user input. Narrow, well-understood cases only. Microsoft warns broad rules here affect security posture.
Elevate as current userRuns under the user own account. Only where virtual account elevation breaks the application. Broader attack surface.
DenyBlocks a file from running elevated at all. Build these alongside the allow rules, not afterwards.
Default elevation responseConfigured in the elevation settings policy, applying where no specific rule matches.
How a deployment runs

Five steps, and the audit phase is the longest one.

Typically six to twelve weeks depending on how many people currently hold administrator rights. The configuration is quick. Collecting evidence and moving people in waves is what takes the time, and it is what makes it work.
  1. 1

    Licence, and confirm the platform scope

    Endpoint Privilege Management must be licensed in the tenant before policies can be used, and it comes through Intune Plan 2, the Intune Suite or select Microsoft 365 bundles. Microsoft states it applies to Windows, so the scope is your Windows estate and any Apple or Android devices are a separate conversation.

  2. 2

    Deploy the client and enable auditing, changing nothing

    The client installs automatically when an elevation settings policy is assigned. Reporting on unmanaged elevations then runs while everybody still holds their rights, for a few weeks, producing the evidence of what is actually being elevated across the estate rather than what anybody believes.

  3. 3

    Write rules from the evidence

    For the applications that appear repeatedly and are legitimate, matched on publisher certificate or file hash where possible, with argument constraints and child process controls where they add safety. Deny rules for anything that should never run elevated, built at the same time rather than later.

  4. 4

    Set the default response and the approval route

    The default elevation response in the settings policy, plus support approved as the catch-all with a named approver and an agreed response time. This is the safety net that prevents the first unanticipated case becoming the reason the project stops.

  5. 5

    Remove rights in waves, then keep the rules current

    Starting with the population you have the clearest evidence for, then widening. Afterwards the managed elevation reports show what is happening and the rules need maintaining as applications change, which is a small ongoing task rather than a project.

Straight answers

What organisations ask about Endpoint Privilege Management.

Before deploying

Fifteen questions worth answering first.

The first group establishes the current position. The second is rule design. The third is the operational reality that decides whether the project survives the first week of complaints.

Where you are now

  • How many users have local administrator rights?
    Usually more than anybody states.
  • Do you know how often they actually elevate?
    The unmanaged elevation report answers this.
  • Which applications genuinely need elevation?
    Evidence, not opinion.
  • Have you licensed EPM in the tenant?
    Required before policies can be used.
  • Are the devices Windows?
    Microsoft states EPM applies to Windows.

Rule design

  • Can you match on publisher certificate?
    Considerably safer than matching on file name.
  • Do you need argument constraints?
    Allow only certain parameters to be elevated.
  • Should child processes be controlled?
    Otherwise an elevated app can spawn anything.
  • Do any applications need the user profile?
    The only justification for elevate as current user.
  • What deny rules do you want from the start?
    Build them alongside, not afterwards.

Operations

  • Who approves support approved requests?
    And within what timeframe.
  • What is the default elevation response?
    It applies where no rule matches.
  • How will you remove rights, all at once or in waves?
    Waves, in every case we have run.
  • Who reviews the managed elevation reports?
    They show what is actually happening now.
  • How are new applications handled?
    Rules need maintaining as software changes.
Next step

Get the unmanaged elevation report before you argue about administrator rights.

Tell us about device inventory, applications requiring elevation, existing admin rights and approval owners. We will confirm the requirements and proposed scope with you.