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API security, UAE

Seven of the top ten API risks are authorisation problems a scanner cannot find.

Broken object level authorisation is the first entry on the published list, and it looks like a valid request with a different identifier. Testing APIs properly requires understanding what each object is and who should be able to reach it.

Book an API security assessment See the ten risks

API security assessment for UAE organisations

10 risksIn the published API Security Top 10
Object levelThe first and most exploited category
Business flowsA risk category with no technical signature
InventoryA risk in its own right, ranked ninth

Why scanners miss most of this

An automated tool cannot know that object 4471 belongs to somebody else.

That single limitation explains why API assessments produce findings that months of automated scanning did not.

Broken object level authorisation looks like a perfectly valid request. Correct method, valid token, well formed body, and an identifier belonging to another customer. There is no malformed input to detect and no error to flag, because the API answers normally.
Property level issues are equally invisible. A response containing fields the caller should not see is a valid response. Mass assignment accepting a field the caller should not be able to set is a valid request. Both require knowing the intended data model.
Business flow abuse has no technical signature at all. Automating a flow that was designed for human pace is not a vulnerability in any single request, and the harm is commercial rather than technical, which is why tools have nothing to alert on.
What finds these is a tester with two accounts, an understanding of what the objects represent, and the patience to enumerate. That is a human activity informed by the documentation, which is one more reason inventory sits on the list as its own risk.

Ask us how we test authorisation

What an API assessment covers

Eight things that make API testing different from web testing.

APIs fail differently from web applications. The requests are well formed, the responses are valid, and the vulnerability is that the caller should not have been allowed to make that request in the first place.

Object level authorisation is the first risk

APIs tend to expose endpoints that handle object identifiers, creating a wide attack surface of object level access control issues. Changing an identifier in a valid request is the simplest attack there is and it remains the most successful.

Authentication is often implemented incorrectly

Mechanisms are frequently implemented in ways that allow attackers to compromise authentication tokens, or to exploit implementation flaws to assume other user identities temporarily or permanently. Token handling is where most of this occurs.

Property level authorisation is separate

The third entry combines excessive data exposure and mass assignment, emphasising the lack of or improper authorisation validation at the object property level. An endpoint can be correctly authorised and still return or accept fields it should not.

Resource consumption is a security risk

Satisfying API requests requires network bandwidth, CPU, memory and storage. Unrestricted consumption can be exploited to cause denial of service or to increase operational costs, which in a cloud environment is a direct financial impact.

Function level authorisation fails in complex models

Complex access control policies with different hierarchies, groups and roles, and an unclear separation between administrative and regular functions, tend to lead to authorisation flaws. Most estates have exactly that complexity.

Business flows can be abused without any flaw

A vulnerable API exposes a business flow without compensating for how the functionality could harm the business if used excessively in an automated manner. Nothing is technically broken, and the business outcome is still damaging.

Inventory is a risk category in itself

APIs tend to expose more endpoints than traditional web applications, which makes proper and updated documentation highly important. Undocumented, deprecated and forgotten endpoints are a named risk rather than an administrative untidiness.

Consuming other APIs carries its own risk

Developers tend to trust data received from third party APIs more than user input, and so tend to adopt weaker security standards for it. That inversion of trust is the tenth entry and it is almost never tested.

The published list

Ten risks, and what each one actually looks like.

Taken from the published edition. The identifiers are stable, which makes them a useful shared vocabulary between a testing team, a development team and a customer asking about your API.

	Identifier	Risk
API1:2023	Broken Object Level Authorization	A valid request with somebody else identifier
API2:2023	Broken Authentication	Token compromise or assuming another identity
API3:2023	Broken Object Property Level Authorization	Fields returned or accepted that should not be
API4:2023	Unrestricted Resource Consumption	Denial of service or a large cloud bill
API5:2023	Broken Function Level Authorization	Regular users reaching administrative functions
API6:2023	Unrestricted Access to Sensitive Business Flows	Automation of a flow designed for humans
API7:2023	Server Side Request Forgery	Fetching a remote resource from an unvalidated URI
API8:2023	Security Misconfiguration	Complex configuration with missed settings
API9:2023	Improper Inventory Management	Endpoints nobody documented or retired
API10:2023	Unsafe Consumption of APIs	Trusting third party responses more than user input

How we approach it

Four things that make an API assessment worth commissioning.

The value comes almost entirely from the manual authorisation work, which is why the scoping conversation focuses on access to accounts and documentation rather than on tooling.

We test with real accounts at different privilege levels

Object level authorisation cannot be assessed from one account, because the test is whether account A can reach account B data. Getting several accounts provisioned before the engagement starts is the single biggest determinant of finding quality.

We enumerate before we test

Improper inventory management is a named risk, and it is the precondition for the rest. Old versions, undocumented endpoints and internet reachable non production environments are found in this phase and they are frequently the most serious findings.

We include business flow abuse

The published list includes exposing a business flow without compensating for how it could harm the business if used excessively in an automated manner. That requires understanding the business, and it is the category most testing simply omits.

We report against stable identifiers

Findings mapped to the published identifiers give developers, security teams and customers a shared vocabulary. It also lets an organisation compare assessments over time and across products without translating between report formats.

How an engagement runs

Three phases across roughly four to eight weeks.

Length depends on endpoint count and how much documentation exists. Authorisation testing is the slow part because it is genuinely manual.

01
Weeks 1 to 2
Inventory and understand
Every endpoint across versions and environments, what objects each exposes, what the intended authorisation model is, and which flows have business significance. Documentation is assessed as part of this, since inventory is a named risk.
- Endpoint inventory across versions and environments
- Object and property model documented
- Intended authorisation model captured
- Sensitive business flows identified
02
Weeks 3 to 6
Test authorisation properly
Object level, property level and function level authorisation tested with multiple accounts at different privilege levels. This is the part that produces the findings, and it cannot be automated because it depends on knowing what should be permitted.
- Object level authorisation tested per endpoint
- Property level exposure and mass assignment tested
- Function level separation tested across roles
- Findings evidenced with reproducible requests
03
Weeks 7 to 8
The remaining categories and the report
Authentication and token handling, resource consumption limits, business flow abuse, server side request forgery, configuration, and how your API consumes other APIs. Then a report structured around the published identifiers.
- Authentication and token handling assessed
- Rate and resource limits tested
- Business flow abuse scenarios exercised
- Report structured by the published risk identifiers

Where this comes up

Six situations that prompt an assessment.

APIs get tested when somebody outside asks, or when something has already gone wrong through one.

A UAE company whose product is mostly API

Where the API is the product, its security is the product security. Web application testing that treats the API as an implementation detail behind a front end misses the interface customers and attackers actually use.

A financial services firm exposing open banking interfaces

Regulated interfaces attract informed attackers and informed auditors. Object and function level authorisation across account hierarchies is exactly the complex access control the fifth risk describes, and it needs deliberate testing.

A business suffering automated abuse

Bulk account creation, inventory hoarding, promotional code enumeration and scraping are business flow abuse rather than technical vulnerabilities. The published list treats them as a distinct risk, which is what makes them addressable.

An organisation with an unexplained cloud bill

Unrestricted resource consumption can lead to denial of service or increased operational costs. Where consumption based cloud spending rises without a matching business explanation, an unlimited endpoint is a plausible cause worth testing.

A team that has accumulated API versions

Every version that was never retired remains an attack surface, usually receiving less attention than the current one. Enumerating versions and environments regularly finds interfaces the current team did not know were still serving traffic.

A product that integrates several third party services

Developers tend to trust data received from third party APIs more than user input, adopting weaker standards for it. Where your product processes responses from payment, identity, logistics or data providers, that trust deserves testing.

Three positions

How UAE organisations test their APIs.

The middle column is common and it creates a false sense of coverage, because the scanner reports clean on exactly the categories that dominate the published list.

Object level authorisation tested

Manual assessment against the listYes, with multiple accounts

Automated scanning onlyNo

Tested as part of the web appRarely

Property level issues found

Manual assessment against the listYes

Automated scanning onlyNo

Tested as part of the web appNo

Function level separation tested

Manual assessment against the listYes

Automated scanning onlyPartially

Tested as part of the web appNo

Business flow abuse considered

Manual assessment against the listYes

Automated scanning onlyNo

Tested as part of the web appNo

Full endpoint inventory produced

Manual assessment against the listYes

Automated scanning onlyCrawled only

Tested as part of the web appPartial

Old versions included

Manual assessment against the listYes

Automated scanning onlyIf discovered

Tested as part of the web appNo

Third party consumption assessed

Manual assessment against the listYes

Automated scanning onlyNo

Tested as part of the web appNo

Findings reproducible

Manual assessment against the listWith exact requests

Automated scanning onlyTool output

Tested as part of the web appVaries

Maps to a published risk list

Manual assessment against the listYes

Automated scanning onlyLoosely

Tested as part of the web appNo

Effort

Manual assessment against the listWeeks, mostly manual

Automated scanning onlyHours

Tested as part of the web appIncluded, superficially

Feature	Manual assessment against the list	Automated scanning only	Tested as part of the web app
Object level authorisation tested	Yes, with multiple accounts	No	Rarely
Property level issues found	Yes	No	No
Function level separation tested	Yes	Partially	No
Business flow abuse considered	Yes	No	No
Full endpoint inventory produced	Yes	Crawled only	Partial
Old versions included	Yes	If discovered	No
Third party consumption assessed	Yes	No	No
Findings reproducible	With exact requests	Tool output	Varies
Maps to a published risk list	Yes	Loosely	No
Effort	Weeks, mostly manual	Hours	Included, superficially

The one to fix first

Improper inventory management is ninth on the list and first in practice.

You cannot assess, protect or retire an endpoint you do not know exists, which makes this risk the precondition for addressing the other nine.

The published description is that APIs tend to expose more endpoints than traditional web applications, which makes proper and updated documentation highly important. Endpoint counts in the hundreds are ordinary and are rarely fully documented.
Old versions are the classic case. A version two rollout rarely retires version one, because a client somewhere still calls it. Version one then stops receiving the attention version two gets, while continuing to expose the same data through weaker controls.
Non production environments are the second case. Staging and test APIs frequently hold copies of production data behind noticeably weaker authentication, and they are reachable from the internet far more often than their owners believe.
The assessment starts here for practical reasons. Enumerating what exists, including versions and environments, is what determines the scope of everything else, and it routinely surfaces endpoints nobody in the room knew were still running.

Ask us to enumerate your API estate

How an engagement runs

Five steps, and the middle three are manual by necessity.

Automation contributes to inventory and configuration. The authorisation categories that dominate the published list require a person who understands the data model.

1
Enumerate the API estate
Every endpoint across versions and environments, since APIs tend to expose more endpoints than traditional web applications and documentation is frequently incomplete. Undocumented and deprecated interfaces are recorded as findings in their own right.
2
Understand the intended authorisation model
What each object represents, who should be able to read and modify it, which properties are sensitive, and where the boundary between administrative and regular functions sits. Testing authorisation requires knowing what correct looks like.
3
Test object, property and function level authorisation
With multiple accounts at different privilege levels, enumerating identifiers, attempting to set properties that should be restricted, and reaching functions that should be separated. These three categories produce most findings in most assessments.
4
Cover the remaining categories
Authentication and token handling, resource consumption limits, sensitive business flows exercised at automated pace, server side request forgery where remote resources are fetched, configuration per environment, and consumption of third party APIs.
5
Report against the published identifiers
Each finding mapped to its identifier, evidenced with a reproducible request, and prioritised by exploitability and business impact rather than by category order. That structure makes remediation assignable and progress measurable.

Straight answers

What organisations ask about API security assessment.

Because most of the published risks are authorisation problems. A request with a valid token and somebody else object identifier is technically well formed and returns a normal response, so there is nothing for a scanner to flag.

APIs expose endpoints handling object identifiers, creating a wide attack surface of object level access control issues. In practice it means changing an identifier in an otherwise valid request and receiving data belonging to a different customer.

The endpoint may correctly authorise the object while still returning fields the caller should not see, or accepting fields the caller should not be able to set. The published entry combines excessive data exposure and mass assignment for that reason.

At least two at the same privilege level, so we can test whether one can reach the other data, plus accounts at each distinct privilege level in the model. This is the most important preparation step and it is often the slowest.

Exposing a business flow without compensating for how the functionality could harm the business if used excessively in an automated manner. Bulk registration, inventory hoarding and code enumeration are typical, and none involve a technical defect.

Because APIs tend to expose more endpoints than traditional web applications, making proper and updated documentation highly important. An endpoint nobody knows about receives no patching, no review and no monitoring.

They are frequently the most serious finding. A retired version that was never actually switched off keeps serving data under the controls it had when it was written, while all the security attention goes to the current version.

They belong in scope. Staging and test APIs often hold realistic data behind weaker authentication and are reachable from the internet more often than their owners expect, which makes them an efficient route to production data.

Yes, and it has a financial dimension. Satisfying requests consumes bandwidth, CPU, memory and storage, and unrestricted consumption can lead to denial of service or to substantially increased operational costs in a consumption billed environment.

It occurs when an API fetches a remote resource without validating the user supplied URI. Any feature that accepts a URL and retrieves it, such as webhooks, imports, previews or integrations, is worth examining for this specifically.

Because developers tend to trust data received from third party APIs more than user input and adopt weaker security standards for it. A compromised or misbehaving upstream service then reaches your systems through a path with fewer checks.

An API assessment is a focused penetration test with a defined risk taxonomy. General application testing frequently treats APIs as plumbing behind the interface, which means the authorisation categories that dominate the published list go untested.

Annually as a baseline, and after significant changes to the authorisation model, the data model or the API surface. Adding an endpoint that exposes a new object type is exactly the change that reintroduces object level authorisation risk.

Findings mapped to the published identifiers, each evidenced with a reproducible request and response, prioritised by exploitability and business impact, with an inventory appendix listing every endpoint discovered including undocumented ones.

We scope by endpoint count and the complexity of the authorisation model. The free first step: ask your team how many API endpoints you expose in total, including old versions. The gap between the answer and reality is usually the story.

Not necessarily. A representative environment with realistic data and the same authorisation model works well, provided it genuinely mirrors production. Where the environments differ in authorisation logic, testing the wrong one produces misleading assurance.

Scope, rate limits and timing agreed in advance, with a named contact reachable throughout. Authorisation testing is mostly reading rather than writing, and where writes are needed they are agreed and confined to test data.

The same risk categories apply and the testing technique differs. Object and property level authorisation questions are if anything more acute where a single endpoint can return arbitrary shapes of data based on the query supplied.

Yes, and they are frequently the most productive target. Mobile clients are trusted more than they should be, and the assumption that only your own application will call the backend produces exactly the authorisation gaps this list describes.

By checking ownership on every request against the authenticated identity, at the data access layer rather than in individual handlers. Fixes applied handler by handler tend to be incomplete, because the next handler somebody writes will miss it.

Usually retiring endpoints that should not be running. Old versions and undocumented interfaces are removed rather than fixed, which reduces attack surface immediately and costs nothing beyond confirming that nothing legitimate still calls them.

Available rather than present. Questions about what an object represents and who should reach it come up constantly, and a developer who can answer them within the hour materially improves both the speed and the accuracy of the assessment.

Authorisation tests in the pipeline, written the same way the assessment tested manually, using two accounts. Once written they run on every change, which is the only durable answer to a risk category that returns with each new endpoint.

Partially. Limits raise the cost of automation and do not by themselves prevent it, because the flow is being used as designed. Compensating for how functionality could harm the business if automated usually needs design changes as well as limits.

By endpoint count and authorisation complexity rather than by application count. A small API with a complex object ownership model takes longer to test properly than a large one where every object belongs to a single tenant.

API readiness check

Fifteen questions to ask your development team.

These are answerable without any tooling, and the pattern of hesitation usually predicts the findings quite accurately.

Inventory

How many endpoints do we expose?
An exact number.
Which old versions are still live?
Usually more than expected.
Are staging APIs internet reachable?
Often, unintentionally.
Is the documentation current?
A named risk category.
Who owns each endpoint?
Retirement needs an owner.

Authorisation

Is object ownership checked every request?
The first risk.
Can a user set fields they should not?
Mass assignment.
Do responses include hidden fields?
Excessive exposure.
Are admin functions separated clearly?
Function level risk.
Have we tested with two real accounts?
The essential test.

Everything else

Are there rate and size limits?
Resource consumption.
Could a business flow be automated?
A distinct risk.
Do we fetch user supplied URIs?
Server side request forgery.
Do we validate third party responses?
The tenth risk.
Is configuration reviewed per environment?
Misconfiguration.

Ask your team how many API endpoints you expose, including old versions.

Then compare that number with what a proper enumeration finds. Improper inventory management is a named risk, and the gap is usually where the serious findings live.

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	Identifier	Risk	What it looks like in practice
API1:2023	Broken Object Level Authorization	A valid request with somebody else identifier
API2:2023	Broken Authentication	Token compromise or assuming another identity
API3:2023	Broken Object Property Level Authorization	Fields returned or accepted that should not be
API4:2023	Unrestricted Resource Consumption	Denial of service or a large cloud bill
API5:2023	Broken Function Level Authorization	Regular users reaching administrative functions
API6:2023	Unrestricted Access to Sensitive Business Flows	Automation of a flow designed for humans
API7:2023	Server Side Request Forgery	Fetching a remote resource from an unvalidated URI
API8:2023	Security Misconfiguration	Complex configuration with missed settings
API9:2023	Improper Inventory Management	Endpoints nobody documented or retired
API10:2023	Unsafe Consumption of APIs	Trusting third party responses more than user input

Risk

What it looks like in practice

API1:2023

Broken Object Level Authorization

A valid request with somebody else identifier

API2:2023

Broken Authentication

Token compromise or assuming another identity

API3:2023

Broken Object Property Level Authorization

Fields returned or accepted that should not be

API4:2023

Unrestricted Resource Consumption

Denial of service or a large cloud bill

API5:2023

Broken Function Level Authorization

Regular users reaching administrative functions

API6:2023

Unrestricted Access to Sensitive Business Flows

Automation of a flow designed for humans

API7:2023

Server Side Request Forgery

Fetching a remote resource from an unvalidated URI

API8:2023

Security Misconfiguration

Complex configuration with missed settings

API9:2023

Improper Inventory Management

Endpoints nobody documented or retired

API10:2023

Unsafe Consumption of APIs

Trusting third party responses more than user input

Feature

Manual assessment against the list

Automated scanning only

Tested as part of the web app

Object level authorisation tested

Yes, with multiple accounts

Rarely

Property level issues found

Yes

Function level separation tested

Yes

Partially

Business flow abuse considered

Yes

Full endpoint inventory produced

Yes

Crawled only

Partial

Old versions included

Yes

If discovered

Third party consumption assessed

Yes

Findings reproducible

With exact requests

Tool output

Varies

Maps to a published risk list

Yes

Loosely

Effort

Weeks, mostly manual

Hours

Included, superficially

Seven of the top ten API risks are authorisation problems a scanner cannot find.

An automated tool cannot know that object 4471 belongs to somebody else.

Eight things that make API testing different from web testing.

Object level authorisation is the first risk

Authentication is often implemented incorrectly

Property level authorisation is separate

Resource consumption is a security risk

Function level authorisation fails in complex models

Business flows can be abused without any flaw

Inventory is a risk category in itself

Consuming other APIs carries its own risk

Ten risks, and what each one actually looks like.

Four things that make an API assessment worth commissioning.

We test with real accounts at different privilege levels

We enumerate before we test

We include business flow abuse

We report against stable identifiers

Three phases across roughly four to eight weeks.

Inventory and understand

Test authorisation properly

The remaining categories and the report

Six situations that prompt an assessment.

A UAE company whose product is mostly API

A financial services firm exposing open banking interfaces

A business suffering automated abuse

An organisation with an unexplained cloud bill

A team that has accumulated API versions

A product that integrates several third party services

How UAE organisations test their APIs.

Improper inventory management is ninth on the list and first in practice.

Five steps, and the middle three are manual by necessity.

Enumerate the API estate

Understand the intended authorisation model

Test object, property and function level authorisation

Cover the remaining categories

Report against the published identifiers

What organisations ask about API security assessment.

Why not just run a scanner?

What is broken object level authorisation?

How is property level different?

What accounts do you need from us?

What is business flow abuse?

Why is inventory on a security list?

Do old API versions matter?

What about our non production environments?

Is resource consumption really a security issue?

What is server side request forgery in an API?

Why does consuming other APIs carry risk?

How does this relate to a penetration test?

How often should we test?

What does the report look like?

What does an engagement cost?

Do you need production access?

How do you avoid disrupting the service?

What about GraphQL and other non REST interfaces?

Do you test mobile application backends?

How do we fix broken object level authorisation?

What is the quickest win after an assessment?

Should developers be present during testing?

How do we prevent regression?

Does rate limiting solve business flow abuse?

How do we scope an assessment sensibly?

Fifteen questions to ask your development team.

Inventory

Authorisation

Everything else

The pages around this one.

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Ask your team how many API endpoints you expose, including old versions.

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